This paper presents fault detection and isolation (FDI) algorithms for attitude determination system (ADS) of a satellite including a sun sensor and a magnetometer. The suggested methodology is based on derivation of all possible rotations between reference and body frames and computation of Euler angles by them. Using the resulted Euler angles, some variance measures have been derived that offer a solution for analytical model-free fault detection mechanism. Consequently, when significant variations occur in these variances a fault occurrence is declared. It is shown that by properly categorizing the Euler angles computation methods, not only the faulty sensors but also their faulty components could be isolated. Based on the mentioned feature, four steps of fault isolation have been proposed. In the first step, fault occurrence in only one component of a sensor is isolated. In the second step, two faults in two different sensors are investigated. In the third step, two faults in one sensor are evaluated that means a high level of failure in the sensor. Finally, if fault does not belong to the above categories, it means that more than 50% damage has been occurred in the ADS hardware. Through extensive simulation studies, the desired performance and accuracy of the outlined methods have been demonstrated. Analitička detekcija pogreške i izolacijski algoritmi zasnovani na rotacijskim matricama za satelit s tri osi. Ovaj rad prikazuje detekciju pogreške i izolacijske algoritme za sustav odredivanja stanja satelita uključujući sunčani senzor i magnetometar. Predložena metodologija temelji se odredivanju svih mogućih rotacija medu referentnim i stvarnim koordinatnim sustavima i Eulerovim kutevima medu njima. Koristeći Eulerove kutove dobivene su varijance pomoću kojih se dobiva rješenje za analitičku detekciju pogreške bez korištenja modela. U slučaju značajnih promjena varijance detektirana je pogreška. Pokazano je da se prikladnim kategoriziranjem izračuna Eulerovih kuteva uz pogreške senzora može i izolirati komponenta senzora koja je uzrokovala pogreku. Na temelju toga predlažu sečetiri koraka izolacije pogreške. U prvom koraku, izolirano je postojanje pogreške u samo jednom senzoru. U drugom koraku, istražuju se dvije pogreške u dva različita senzora. U trećem koraku, promatraju se dvije pogreške u jednom senzoru štoće značiti visoku razimu pogreške u senzoru. Konačno, ukoliko pogreška ne pripada niti jednoj od navedenih kategorija, to znači da je prisutno oštećenje opreme veće od 50 %. Kroz opsežne simulacije prikazano je željeno ponašanje i točnost navedene metode.
INTRODUCTION
Satellite pointing accuracy is one of the main requirements that its satisfaction depends on the perfect-healthy performance of the attitude determination and control system (ADCS). Investigation of fault events in different missions shows that many of occurred faults in the sensors and actuators have led to the degradation of expected services, loss of vehicle control or in case of total failures, catastrophic loss of mission [1] . Therefore, there is a need to develop fault tolerance tools in a safety critical system such as ADCS, capable of detecting and isolating any component fault.
In this paper, the problems of fault detection and isolation for attitude determination sensors are addressed. Attitude determination (AD) is the process of computing the orientation of the satellite relative to a reference frame. To completely determine the orientation of a rigid body satellite, three angles between the satellite body frame and the selected reference frame must be specified.
These three angles are known as attitude angles or Eu-ler angles. Consequently, the objective of AD in a satellite is to generate measurements of the attitude angles for use by its controllers. A procedure frequently used on three axis stabilized satellites is to determine the attitude by measuring the orientation of two reference vectors fixed in inertial space. In this paper, the above vectors are chosen as the sun vector and the earth magnetic field vector. The sun vector specifies at each time the satellite orientation with respect to the sun. Also, the magnetic field vector shows the earth magnetic field coordinates at each orbital position around the earth. So, a two axis sun sensor and a three axis orthogonal magnetometer have been selected as attitude determination hardware to provide the mentioned reference vectors in the body frame [2] . Today, analytical model based fault detection and isolation methods have been applied in the ADS as a mature and structured field of research. Most of these approaches are relied on residual generation by the Kalman filters, using the Eigen structure assignment techniques or sensor fault estimation by different types of observers [3, 4] . In [5] , two Kalman filters have been used for fault detection and isolation based on measured outputs from gyros, sun sensor and magnetometer. Also, the problem of fault detection and isolation for satellite nonlinear dynamics has been addressed using the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) and the Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) [6] . The authors of [7] have suggested a robust UKF that provides a more effective convergence of the state estimation error. Another application of unscented Kalman filters, entitled federated UKF, has been presented in [8] . This approach that uses a local UKF for each of sensors provides the fault detection, fault isolation and continuity of the estimation process. Eigen structure assignment techniques propose another alternative for fault detection based on residual generation. In [9] , an Eigen structure assignment technique has been used for fault detection of gyros in the Indian satellite named IRS. Residual generation in this approach can be accomplished such that the fault isolation between different sensors becomes possible. Another category of FDI mechanisms are observer based methods. In this regard, [10] has been proposed predictive filters for sensor fault reconstruction. Adaptive methods are other fault estimation techniques. For instance, the methodology suggested by [11, 12] uses neural networks in combination with adaptive techniques to estimate the fault magnitude. Sliding mode observers have also a similar operational technique in which the equivalent output injection signal is utilized for fault reconstruction purposes [13] [14] [15] [16] .
All the fault detection and isolation mechanisms detailed above, are model based approaches which operate based on satisfaction of sensors and actuators outputs with respect to the expected dynamical relations of system. The above principle, despite proposing the mentioned advantages, loses its ability in conditions that simultaneous faults occur in both sensors and actuators. To deal with the above problem i.e. removing the mentioned restrictive assumption, this paper presents a novel analytical model-free method that provides the FDI features in the ADS independent of the health status of actuators. This approach is obtained based on all possible rotations between reference and body frames and computation of Euler angles by them. Using the resulted Euler angles, some variance measures are derived that offer a solution for analytical modelfree fault detection mechanism. Therefore, when significant variations occur in these variances, it is argued that the measurement noises alone cannot explain these variations and so our proposed algorithm declares a fault happening.
After fault detection, the faulty sensors should be determined in the isolation stage. In this paper, it is shown that by properly categorizing the computation methods, not only the faulty sensors but also their faulty components are isolated. Accordingly, four isolation steps are designed to determine the fault type. In the developed algorithm, these steps are checked sequentially and in each step the required warnings are declared. In the first step, fault occurrence in only one of the sensors components is evaluated. In the second step, two faults in two different sensors are investigated. In the third step, two faults in two components of a sensor are evaluated that warns a high level of failure in that sensor. Naturally, if fault does not belong to any of the above categories, at least three components of sensors have been deteriorated. In this condition, an indicator flag is triggered to warn a more than 50% failure in the ADS hardware.
As it was mentioned, the suggested solution proposes model-free fault detection and isolation mechanisms which their performances are independent of the attitude control system health. So, fault detection and isolation in the ADS can be achieved even when the actuators are faulty. Moreover, the cited method suggests an analytical approach; so, a higher reliability is achieved by avoiding additional mass, power and cost.
The outline of this paper is as follows. In section 2, defined coordinate systems are described. Derivation stages of the Euler angles based on all possible rotations are stated in section 3. Design of fault detection algorithm is introduced in section 4. In section 5, fault isolation algorithms are presented. Numerical simulations for a number of faulty scenarios that occur in the attitude sensors are included in section 6. Finally, conclusions are presented in section 7.
DEFINED COORDINATE SYSTEMS
As mentioned before, the attitude angles describe the relation between the satellite body coordinate system and a reference frame. Since in this paper, the satellite motion is assumed in an orbit around the earth, the orbital frame is selected as the reference frame. The above coordinate frames which have been used for the satellite motion analysis are defined as follows; 1 orbital frame which has its origin at the satellite's center of mass, Z o axis points toward the center of mass of the earth, X o axis is perpendicular to the Z o axis in the direction of the satellite velocity and Y o axis completes a three-axis right-handed orthogonal system, 2 body fixed frame which has its origin at the satellite's center of mass and its axes (X b , Y b and Z b ) aligned with the principal axes of satellite inertia.
EULER ANGLES DERIVATION FROM THE RO-TATION MATRICES
As mentioned in the previous section, the Euler angles define how the satellite body frame is related to the orbital frame (as reference frame). This rotation is described using a rotation matrix that maps vectors from the orbital frame to the body frame. This matrix is expressed in triangular functions of the Euler angles. In our treatment, the Euler angles are defined as the rotation angles about the body axes as follows: ϕ about the X axis, θ about the Y axis and ψ about the Z axis.
According to different order of rotation of the axes of the satellite with respect to the reference frame, there may be as many as rotation matrices. A well-known rotation matrix which has been widely used in the aerospace applications is obtained by respectively doing the rotations of ψ about the Z axis, θ about the Y axis and ϕ about the X axis ( Figure 1) . So, the b o T transformation matrix is computed by doing the following matrix multiplications:
(1) where c and s denote cos and sin, respectively. We refer the reader to [17] to see components of the T ψ , T θ and T ϕ matrices. The attitude determination system derives the above transformation matrix using the sensor measurements; accordingly, the Euler angles (the ADS outputs) are computed as follows using the b o T components:
Calculating Euler angles using the rotation matrix method is simplified if the sun vector and the magnetic vector are in the form 0 0 1 T and b 1 0 b 3 T respectively where b 1 and b 3 are arbitrary parameters (these calculations will be detailed in the next sections). Since in the satellite systems, the orbital frame is chosen as the reference frame, all above six components are nonzero. To resolve this problem, an intermediate frame is derived in this paper where the mentioned reference vectors are expressed in the desired form. This coordinate system is obtained by applying sequential transformations on the orbital frame.
Slika 1. Relation between the axes and the rotation angles
So, in the design procedure of the FDI mechanisms, the orbital frame should be replaced by the intermediate frame and all the rotation matrices and the Euler angles should be derived relative to this frame. To avoid confusion, in the rest of this paper these angles are called the "intermediate Euler angles ϕ v , θ v , ψ v 2. It is important to note that the proposed FDI mechanisms use the intermediate Euler angles and are independent of the AD algorithm. In the following, the intermediate frame is defined in section 3.1 and then in section 3.2, computation methods of the Euler angles based on the mentioned intermediate frame are stated.
Definition of the intermediate frame
Intermediate frame is defined such that the sun vector su and the earth magnetic vector m in this frame are stated as follows: Figure 2 illustrates the intermediate frame and the above attitude vectors. As shown in this figure, Z v axis is corresponding to the sun vector su, X v axis is selected such that the magnetic vector is placed on the X v -Z v plane and Y v axis completes a three-axis right-handed orthogonal system. The orbital frame, defined in section 2, has been shown in this figure. The sun vector and the earth magnetic vector in the orbital frame are denoted respectively as su xo su yo su zo T and m xo m yo m zo T .
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The sun vector in the orbital frame is derived by modelling the relative position of the satellite and the sun. Also, the earth magnetic vector is computed using the International Geomagnetic Reference Field (IGRF) earth magnetic model [2] .
Therefore, the mentioned vectors are model vectors that are always known. After transformation into the intermediate frame, the resulted vectors su v and m v are also known (i.e. b 1 and b 3 in (5) are known). According to the defined intermediate frame, the transformation matrix between the orbital and body frames, is determined as: 
where b v T is the transformation matrix between the intermediate and body frames and v o T is the transformation matrix between the orbital and intermediate frames.
In the above equation, v o T is a known matrix that obtained using the modelled vectors in the orbital frame. This matrix can be derived by application the following rotations on the orbital frame and using the sun vector and the magnetic vector modelled in this frame:
1) Rotation about the Y o axis with angle α which is the angle between the sun vector projection on the X o -Z o plane and the Z o axis (Figure 2 ). This angle is obtained as below:
2) Rotation about the X axis of the rotated frame with angle β which is the angle between the sun vector projection on the X o -Z o plane and the sun vector ( Figure 2 ). This angle is computed as:
By application of the above rotations, the sun vector is transformed to su = 0 0 1 T and the magnetic vector is transformed to m = m 1 m 2 m 3 T .
3) Rotation about the Z axis of the rotated frame with angle γ which is the angle between the magnetic vector projection on the X-Y plane and the X axis ( Figure 2 ). This angle is calculated as:
Accordingly, v o T is derived as:
The b v T matrix in 6 is an important transformation that is associated with the sensors measurements as follows:
where m x m y m z T and su x su y su z T are respectively the outputs measured by the magnetometer and the sun sensor in the body frame. So, fault occurrence in the sensors will affect the matrix components. In the next section, we focus on this transformation and derive different calculation methods of this matrix. Also, different computation methods of the intermediate Euler angles using the above matrix components are described. These angles are used to design the FDI mechanisms. 
Derivation of the rotation matrices between the intermediate and body frames
As it was mentioned, before designing the fault detection and isolation algorithms, it is necessary to derive all possible rotation matrices between the intermediate and body frames. For this, first, the yaw-pitch-roll (YPR) rotation matrix that is a common rotation in aerospace applications is considered. Then, based on this rotation, all possible computation methods to determine the intermediate Euler angles are derived. Afterwards, other rotation sequence formulations for calculating the intermediate Euler angles are calculated.
The rotation matrix YPR that is generated by respectively the rotations ψ v about the Z axis, θ v about the Y axis and ϕ v about the X axis is given by:
So, according to 11, 12 and 13, the intermediate Euler angles are computed as follows:
As it can be observed, the intermediate Euler angles can be determined when some components of the attitude sensors are not available. For instance in 14, only the su x , su y and m x components are required for rotation angles derivation. The above computation method is titled YPR1. Once again, using another combination of components in the rotation matrix YPR (see again (11), 12 and 13) the intermediate Euler angles can be computed according to:
In this case, the three components su z , su y and m x are used to determine the intermediate angles. This computation method is titled YPR2. Similarly, the rotation angles can be obtained using four another approaches which use some subsets of sensors output components. The corresponding computation methods are not presented here for brevity.
In the following, the procedure used for another 11 rotations is explained. These rotations with consideration of their sequences are denoted as YPY, YRY, RPR, RYR, PRP, PYP, RYP, PRY, RPY, YRP and PYR which R stands for roll rotation, Y stands for yaw rotation and P stands for pitch rotation. Each of these rotations leads to different computation methods which based on, the intermediate Euler angles are determined. For instance, the rotation RPY that is computed using the rotations ϕ 1 about the X axis, θ 1 about the Y axis and ψ 1 about the Z axis, will be stated as:
According to 11, 12 and 16, the rotation angles ϕ 1 , θ 1 and ψ 1 can be obtained as below in which the components m x , m y , m z and su z are used:
where
The above computation method is titled RPY1. An important point to note is that intermediate Euler angles are defined according to the aerospace sequence. If a different rotation sequence is used, the rotation angles obtained are different from the standard intermediate Euler angles. So, the angles obtained have to be converted to the standard Euler angles. The rotation angles ϕ 1 , θ 1 and ψ 1 derived from 17 are converted to the standard Euler angles using 19 below:
Using the above equality together with 13 and 16, the intermediate Euler angles can be derived as:
In the RPY rotation, the rotation angles can also be computed using another sensors measurement data as: 
The above method is titled RPY2. Similar to the RPY1 method, the intermediate
FAULT DETECTION ALGORITHM
In this section, the fault detection algorithm using the derived computation methods is detailed. As mentioned before, after fault occurrence in each of the sensors components, the proposed computations methods are affected. This fact motivated us to introduce some variance measures using the intermediate Euler angles which have been resulted in by all of the 25 methods. These variances are defined as: The computation method includes the related sensor component :
The computation method does not include the related sensor component So, these variations can be used as a measure for fault detection. To prevent the noise effects, a threshold is selected for fault detection. The decision making process for fault detection is accomplished as follows: Figure 3 depicts the interface details of the developed fault detection algorithm in the satellite onboard computer (OBC). For this, the sun sensor and the magnetometer measurements are received as inputs. Also, it is necessary that the sun vector and the magnetic field vector are generated in the orbital frame. After applying the rotation matrices, the above modeling vectors are transferred to the intermediate coordinate frame. So, according to the design presented in this section, it is possible to form the variance measures using the sensors measurements and the modelling vectors. These measures can realize the fault detection feature in the ADS sensors.
FAULT ISOLATION ALGORITHM
After fault detection, the faulty sensors should be isolated. In this section, it is shown that by suitable categorizing the computation methods derived in section 3, not only the faulty sensors but also their faulty components could be isolated. For this, four isolation steps have been developed. Figure 4 depicts the execution sequence of each of these four steps. The presented sequence is performed repeatedly in the ADS and the required warnings are declared.
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Slika 3. The designed fault detection mechanism
As it is illustrated in this figure, the developed fault detection and isolation algorithms are considered to implement in the satellite on-board computer (OBC) and receive as inputs the sensor measurements and modelling vectors.
• Step 1: Evaluation of fault occurrence in only one component of the sun sensor or one component of the magnetometer (type 1)
• Step 2: Investigation of simultaneous fault occurrence in one component of the sun sensor and one component of the magnetometer (type 2)
• Step 3: Evaluation of fault happening in two components of a sensor. This fault type warns a high level of failure in that sensor (type 3).
• Step 4: If fault does not belong to each of the above categories, a type 4 fault is declared. It means that at least three components of sensors have been deteriorated. In this case, the ADS is faced to more than 50% failure; so an indicator flag is assigned to show this event. Before describing each of the above steps, derived computation methods should be categorized so that the fault isolation can be provided.
If one of the sensors components is deteriorated due to fault occurrence (type 1 faults), the intermediate Euler angles in which the faulty component is not present, are not affected. For instance, a fault in the x component of the magnetometer affects the calculation of the intermediate Euler angles in the methods involving YPR1, YPR3, YPR6, RPY1, YRP3, YRP4, RYP2, PRY2, PYR1, PYR2, YPY2, RPR1, RYR1, PRP1 and PYP1, but the other methods remain unaffected. Therefore, through utilizing the above idea, it is necessary to categorize the methods that don't include one of the sensors components. 
Fault Detection Mechanism
Step 1 Fault Isolation Mechanism
Step 2 Fault Isolation Mechanism
Step 3 Fault Isolation Mechanism
Is it occurred?
Onboard Computer
Slika 4. Different steps of the developed fault isolation mechanism
So, we should develop the variance parameters using the methods presented in Table 2 . For instance, the σ 2 ϕsu x variance corresponding to the x component of the sun sensor (see the first row of Table 2 ) is computed as follows:
where ϕ 1 is substituted respectively by ϕ P Y P , ϕ P RP , 
Similar relations can be derived for σ If one component of the sun sensor and one component of the magnetometer (type 2 faults) are deteriorated, we need to search the computation methods in which the mentioned faulty components are not present. In other words, we require the methods that are not affected by the above faults. Fortunately, by investigation the computation methods, it can be shown that there is more than one computation method corresponding to each state of this fault type. Table 3 presents such a categorization for the mentioned fault happenings. In this case, similar to the procedure done for single fault occurrence, we should develop the variance measures using the existing methods in Table 3 . In case that two faults occur in the magnetometer or two faults occur in the sun sensor (type 3 faults), similar computation methods can be found. These methods have been also presented in Table 3 .
In the following sub sections, the mentioned isolation steps are detailed. As explained before, a fault of type 4 is declared if it does not belong to types 1, 2 and 3.
5.1
Step 1; fault isolation: fault occurrence in only one component of a sensor
According to Table 3 , if fault occurs in only one of the sensors data, 5 variances from the total number of 15 variances don't change significantly, however other variances will have drastic variations. For example, if su x is deteriorated due to fault occurrence, the presented variances in rows 1, 2, 3, 10 and 11 of Table 3 don't alter. With attention again to Table 3 , it can be observed that if two components of sensors are subjected to fault, only one variance doesn't change significantly. For instance, after fault happening in su y and m x only the presented variance in row 4 of Table 3 doesn't change. In fact, the above observations give us a measure to distinguish between the states that one component is faced to a fault or two components are deteriorated. So, in step 1, we should first investigate the calculated variances in Table 3 . If 5 variances have not varied significantly, it means that a type 1 fault has occurred. Accordingly, after it is confirmed that a type 1 fault has occurred, we should investigate the calculated variances in Table 2 to determine the faulty component. The component corresponded to the variance that has the minimum value among all variances is the faulty component. For example in case that fault happens in su x the variance computed in row 1 of Table 2 , should have the minimum value. Note that if a fault of type 1 is diagnosed, it is not necessary to check other steps in the fault isolation chart.
5.2
Step 2; fault isolation: simultaneous fault occurrence in one component of the sun sensor and one component of the magnetometer
After investigation of calculated variances in Table 3 , if it is observed that only one variance has not changed significantly (the minimum variance), two sensors data have Analytical Fault Detection and Isolation Algorithms Based on Rotation Matrices . . . S.S. Nasrolahi, H. Bolandi, M. Abedi been subjected to fault. In this case, the components corresponded to this minimum variance (according to Table 3) are the faulty data. In this conditions, if this component belongs to rows 1 to 9 of Table 3 , a type 2 fault is declared (two faulty components belong to different sensors), else, a type 3 fault has been happened that explained in the next section.
5.3
Step 3; fault isolation: fault occurrence in two components of a sensor
As mentioned in the previous section, after it is confirmed that two components are faulty, we should determine the components corresponding to the minimum variance. If, these components belong to rows 10 to 15 of Table 3, fault of type 3 is declared. It means that two faulty components belong to one sensor (sun sensor or magnetometer).
SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, simulation results of the developed fault detection and isolation algorithms are presented to illustrate the performance of the mentioned algorithms. These simulations are carried out for a Low Earth Orbit (LEO) satellite with the altitude of 700 km, orbit inclination of 98
• and right ascension of the ascending node of 4
• . In the simulation model, output error of sensors is modelled as a white Gaussian noise. In this regard, the standard deviation of the magnetometer noise is selected as 50nT and the standard deviation of the sun sensor noise is chosen as 0.1
• . The sampling rate of sensors is assumed to be equal to 1sec.
In the simulations, a threshold value of 0.004deg 2 has been selected for fault detection process. Figure 5 illustrates the mean value of variances in the absence of sensors faults. The variations of variances depicted in this figure are due to noisy measurements of sensors. As shown in this figure, the threshold value is chosen such that we can distinguish the fault effects from the effects caused by the sensors noises. Note that although in some special moments, the variances exceed the threshold value; however these mutations occur in a short time period less than 3 samples. Therefore, we have selected a 3 samples period for fault declaration. It is important to note that if the threshold value is chosen too small, it can be difficult to distinguish the fault effects from the effects caused by the sensors noises. Also, if the threshold value is selected conservatively, fault detection is done with a delay or the small faults may be not detected. After conducting several simulations, it has been concluded that we need 17 samples (in addition to the 3 samples required for fault detection) to follow the transient effects in the variances and select the minimum variance with confidence. In the performed Table 4 to show the fault type. After determining the fault type, the faulty component/components of sensors should be specified. The flag F 3 has been assigned for this purpose and is valued according to Table 5 for different fault types. Finally, F 4 shows a type 4 fault occurrence. To investigate and study the performance of the designed algorithms, the following scenarios are considered.
Scenario 1: fault in the x component of the magnetometer
In this scenario, a bias fault with the magnitude 5000nT is introduced in the m x at time t = 200s. Figure 6 shows that after fault occurrence, the minimum variance of the intermediate Euler angles (according to (26)) changes significantly that allows detecting the ADS fault. Therefore, F 1 is triggered after 3 samples. Now, the fault source should be isolated. Figure 7 depicts the calculated variances in Table 3 . This figure has been somewhat magnified to make it easier to compare the variance variations. According to this Figure, 5 variances (solid lines) have not changed significantly (they have small variations and are approximately zero) that means only one component is faulty (refer to section 5.1). Therefore, the value 1 is assigned to F 2 (Figure 8 (a) ). To determine the faulty component, it is necessary to compute the variances in Table 2 . Figure 9 shows these variances. As shown in this figure, the variance corresponding to m x has Tablica 5. The F3 flag and its assigned values Fault type
Values Corresponding affected components
the minimum value among all variances (it is approximately zero). So, the value 4 is assigned to F 3 to represent m x as faulty component (Figure 8 (b) ). Note that in this case, steps 2 and 3 are not necessary to execute. Also it takes totally 20 samples to detect the fault and isolate the faulty components (Figure 8(a) ). In this scenario, A fault with the magnitude 5000 nT occurs in the m x at time t = 200s. After that, at time t = 400s, another fault with the magnitude 0.25
• is introduced in the su y . In this case, after occurrence of the first fault, the minimum variance of the intermediate Euler angles changes significantly. Since, the first fault is not resolved and then the second fault occurs, the variance still remains above the threshold value. Because the detection process in this scenario is similar to the first scenario, the resulted graphs are not presented here. Now, the fault isolation mechanism in step 1 should be executed. Figure 10 depicts the calculated variances in Table 3 . As shown in Figure 10 , between times t = 200s and t = 400s, five variances (solid lines) have not varied. It means that in this time interval, only one component has been faced to fault. So, the value 1 is assigned to F 2 ( Figure 11 ) at time t = 220s (17 samples for fault isolation together with 3 samples for fault detection).
Slika 6. Fault detection in scenario 1 using the variation of the variance value Slika 7. Two-components variances in scenario 1
In this time interval it can also be shown that the variance corresponding to m x is minimum and so this component is faulty, as a result the value 4 is assigned to F 3 . With attention again to Figure 10 , it can be observed that after time t = 400s, only one variance has not changed significantly (the blue solid line that is corresponding to m x -su y components). This means that after this time, two Analytical Fault Detection and Isolation Algorithms Based on Rotation Matrices . . . S.S. Nasrolahi, H. Bolandi, M. Abedi components have been subjected to fault and we should evaluate step 2 in the fault isolation chart. Since, after time t = 400s, the variance corresponding to m x -su y has the minimum value (row 2 in Table 3 ), the value 2 is assigned to F 2 (Figure 11 ), also the value 4 is assigned to F 3 . Note that it takes 17 samples to isolate the new faulty condition and so F 2 and F 3 values are changed after this time interval.
Since the fault detection and isolation processes for type 3 faults (step 3 in the fault isolation chart) are similar to the scenario 2 for type 2 faults, the related results are ignored here. A fault with the magnitude 5000nT is introduced in the m x at time t = 150s. After that, another fault with the magnitude 5000 nT occurs in the m y at time t = 300s. Then a fault with the magnitude 0.25
• occurs in the su x at time t = 500s. In this scenario, the fault detection mechanism is performed similar to the previous scenarios. Also, the fault isolation is done similar to the previous scenario until time t = 500s. As shown in Figure 12 , between times t = 150s and t = 300s, 5 variances (solid lines) have changed, so fault has occurred in one component. Between times t = 300s and t = 500s, all variances except the variance corresponding to m x -m y (the blue solid line) have changed significantly. After fault occurrence in three mentioned components (at time t = 500s), all variances (even the variance corresponding to m x -m y ) have changed and exceeded the threshold value (the red dash line). This analysis shows that after time t = 500s, fault does not belong to types 1, 2 and 3.Therefore, a type 4 fault is declared, i.e. more than two components are faulty. After this time, the value 0 is assigned to flags F 2 and F 3 , also at this time F 4 ( Figure 13 ) is triggered with a 17 samples delay. Similarly, by carrying out of simulations for different scenarios, the validity of the proposed fault detection and isolation algorithms could be shown. The associated graphs are not shown here for brevity.
CONCLUSION
This paper described design steps of Euler angles based fault detection and isolation algorithms for a three axis satellite. Performed simulations demonstrated the proper performance of fault detection process using the derived variances. Also, using the suitable categorization of calculation methods, the fault source was isolated in four stages. The conducted simulations demonstrated that the variations profiles of variances in the mentioned stages are completely different to each other that provide the ability to distinguish the supposed fault sources. The prominent feature of the suggested methods is that can provide fault detection and isolation independent of the health status of actuators. Future work is planned to provide the accommodation feature after fault occurrence. 
